Abstract. At CRYPTO 2000, a new public-key encryption based on braid groups was introduced. This paper demonstrates how to solve its underlying problem using the Burau representation. By this method, we show that the private-key can be recovered from the public-key for several parameters with significant probability in a reasonable time. Our attack can be mounted directly on the revised scheme mentioned at ASI-ACRYPT 2001 as well. On the other hand, we give a new requirement for secure parameters against our attack, which more or less conflicts with that against brute force attack.
Introduction
Most current public-key cryptosystems (PKCs) are based on number-theoretic problems such as factoring integers or finding discrete logarithms. The first PKC that is not based on these problems is the Merkle-Hellman encryption based on knapsack problem. Despite the NP-completeness of this problem, all knapsackbased encryptions have been broken. By Shor's algorithms [16] , quantum computers can solve integer factorization problems and discrete logarithm problems efficiently. Although practical quantum computers are at least 10 years away, their potential will soon create distrust in current cryptographic methods [17] . In order to enrich cryptography as well as not to put all eggs in one basket, there have been continuous attempts to develop alternative PKCs based on different kinds of problems. In the later 1990s, lattice cryptography received wide attention. Among the proposed schemes, NTRU, introduced by Hoffstein et al. [7] , has been improved to be secure by Nguyen and Pointcheval [14] .
On the other hand, there have been efforts in the area of noncommutative groups [2, 11, 12, 15] . As a candidate for cryptographically promising noncommutative groups, braid groups have attracted many cryptographers' attention due to efficient implementation and several hard problems. The braid group B n is a torsion-free noncommutative group naturally arising from geometric braids with Outline Section 2 reviews necessary material for this paper. Section 3 describes the revised BPKE [3] , and shows that its security can be reduced to the aforementioned problem for a particular type of instances. Section 4 proposes a new method of solving that problem using the Burau representation, and shows that the private-key can be recovered from the public-key with significant probability in a reasonable time for some parameters proposed at [11] .
Preliminaries

Basic Notations
For a positive integer N , let Z N denote the integers modulo N . For a ring R, Mat n,m (R) stands for the set of all (n × m)-matrices over R, and GL n (R) the general linear group which is the set of all (n × n)-invertible matrices over R. For simplicity, Mat n (R) means Mat n,n (R). I n is the (n × n)-identity matrix. R[t 1 , . . . , t n ] is the ring composed of polynomials in (t 1 , . . . , t n ) with coefficients in R.
Braid Group
Here, we have a quick review of the braid groups. There is a detailed explanation in [11] for beginners.
The n-braid group B n is presented by the (n−1) Artin generators σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 and two kinds of relations σ i σ j = σ j σ i for |i − j| > 1 and σ i σ j σ i = σ j σ i σ j for |i − j| = 1. The monoid 1 B + n can be regarded as the set of all positive words with the identity e n . Let LB n and UB n be the subgroups of B n generated by σ 1 , . . . , σ n/2 −1 and σ n/2 +1 , . . . , σ n−1 , respectively. Thus, LB n could be regarded as B n/2 , and LB
, the supremum of x, sup(x), indicates the smallest integer such that there is P ∈ B + n satisfying ∆ sup(x) n = xP . The infimum of x, inf(x), indicates the largest integer such that there is
The canonical-length of x, len(x), means sup(x) − inf(x). Each of them is an invariant of x. In addition, the word-length of x, wlen(x), indicates the shortest word length of x.
Security of the BPKE
The BPKE was proposed in two versions [11, 3] . We consider the revised scheme described in [3] which is of more general form than the original scheme [11] . A private-key is given as a pair (x 1 , x 2 ) where x 1 and x 2 are in LB n , and the associated public-key is a pair (a, b) where a ∈ B n and b = x 1 ax 2 . The encryption and decryption is as follows.
Encryption Given a message M ∈ {0, 1} k , 1. Choose y 1 , y 2 ∈ UB n at random. 2. Ciphertext is (y 1 ay 2 , h(y 1 by 2 ) ⊕ M ). Decryption Given a ciphertext (c, d) and the private-key (x 1 , x 2 ), compute
Here, h : B n → {0, 1} k is a collision-free hash function. We remark that the original BPKE in [11] is obtained with the condition x 1 = x −1 2 and y 1 = y −1 2 . For a given public-key (a, b), there can be multiple private-keys. If we could find any z 1 , z 2 ∈ LB n such that z 1 az 2 = b, then M is always recovered by computing h(z 1 cz 2 ) ⊕ d regardless of the considered BPKE being the original version (i.e.,
2 ) or the revised one (i.e., x 1 and x 2 are independent). So, the problem of recovering private-key is reduced to the following problem.
Given a, b ∈ B n , find x 1 , x 2 ∈ LB n satisfying b = x 1 ax 2 , provided that such braids exist.
We note that if such x 1 is found then x 2 is automatically derived, and vice versa. This paper considers the above problem for particular instances. Hereinafter, we call this problem the P-BPKE problem for our convenience.
P-BPKE problem: Given a, b ∈ B + n , find x 1 , x 2 ∈ LB + n satisfying b = x 1 ax 2 , provided that such braids exist.
Since the BPKE is described in terms of left-canonical form in [11, 3] , we should discuss it also wherein. In implementing the BPKE, the ranges of a, x 1 , and x 2 are specified. This means that the bounds of their supremums and infimums are finite and given. Let ∆ L denote the fundamental braid within LB n , i.e.,
n for any even integer k, and (ii) if y ∈ B n , k ≤ inf(y), and k < 0, then both ∆ −k n y and y∆ −k n are positive n-braids. Now we show that the security of the BPKE depends on the intractability of the P-BPKE problem. Proposition 1. If the P-BPKE problem is solved, then the private-key of the BPKE can be recovered from its associated public-key.
Proof. Let (a, b) be a given public-key and (x 1 , x 2 ) be its private-key. Since inf(a) is known, we can choose an even integer u so that ∆ u n a is a positive braid. Let a = ∆ u n a. The lower bound of inf(x 1 ) and inf(x 2 ) in LB n is publicly known, say v.
is another private-key corresponding to the public-key (a, b). 
The P-BPKE Problem
This section shows how to solve the P-BPKE problem. A natural way to solve it in B n is via another group G as follows: (i) to transform the problem in B n into the one in G, (ii) to solve the problem in G, and (iii) to lift the solution back into B n . Representations of braid groups-a representation of a group is a homomorphism from that group to GL k (R) for some integer k and domain R of characteristic zero-appear to provide such a group G. In order to perform (iii) above, a faithful representation, Krammer representation, can be considered. However, in this case, an n-braid is transformed into an
-matrix. Since manipulating these matrices, especially in (ii) above, seems unpractical for large braid index and word length, we consider a more practical one, Burau representation. The Burau representation ρ n :
where
The equation ρ n (b) = X 1 ρ n (a)X 2 yields the following four types of equations.
Now we consider e2 and e3. If either A 2 or A 3 is of full rank, then X 1 or X 2 is determined uniquely.
We experiment how often a has full rank A i for i = 2 or 3 by Maple. On input (n, l, t 0 ), our program chooses at random 100 positive n-braid a's with word length l, checks the ranks of A i | t=t0 for i = 2, 3, and then outputs the number of a's for which at least one of A i | t=t0 's has full rank. Figure 1 shows these numbers for various (n, l)'s at t 0 = 2. For several other random integer t 0 's, the results were very similar. The reason is that the degree of independency of the column vectors of A i generally remains the same after substituting randomly chosen integer t 0 for the variable t. For instance, in the case of n = 2m, rank(A i ) = m if and only if det(A i ) = 0. Here, det(A i ) is a polynomial in t, and many of the roots of det(A i ) = 0 lie beyond integers. Note that the existence of t 0 such that A 2 | t=t0 (resp. A 3 | t=t0 ) has full rank implies that A 2 (resp. A 3 ) has also full rank. It is observed that the longer the word length of a is, the higher is the probability that A 2 or A 3 has full rank. One can heighten a little the probability by simultaneously solving three restated linear (in X 1 and X −1 2 ) equations:
Finding X i For a ∈ B + n with full rank A 2 or A 3 , X 1 or X 2 can be computed by solving e2 or e3, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that rank(A 3 ) = m. Every entry of X 2 is expressed as a polynomial in Z[t]. The highest degree of entries in X 2 is at most wlen(x 2 ). In fact, it is far smaller than wlen(x 2 ) for random x 2 . We note that since x 2 ∈ LB + n , the upper bound of wlen(x 2 ) can be computed because wlen(
where m = n/2 and s is the publicly known upper bound of sup(x 2 ) in LB n . Recalling that det(ρ m (σ j )) = −t for every j, wlen(x 2 ) can be derived from We then evaluate (
in the Gauss-Jordan elimination. From these X 2 | t=t0 's, X 2 can be computed by Lagrange interpolating polynomial method with complexity O(m 2 wlen(x 2 ) 2 ) [4] . Hence, the total evaluation of ρ m (x 2 ) from those (
2 ) regarding wlen(x 2 ) as greater than m.
Recovering x from ρ m (x)
Hughes [9] proposed an algorithm recovering a private key of AAFG1 key agreement protocol [1] from its Burau matrix. His main idea is to reconstruct the private key, say x, from ρ m (x) generator by generator from right to left by assuming that the first column with the highest degree polynomial entry in ρ m (x) indicates the last generator of x. The Burau representation is not faithful for n ≥ 5. Namely, no algorithm can recover the designated preimage from the Burau matrix. Hughes' heuristic algorithm behaves much better than expected. It succeeds with 96% for AAFG1 scheme with suggested parameter. A natural question is what is the fundamental reason for this high probability. For Hughes' experiment, we analyze mathematically how that column is connected to the last generator. Using this result, we improve his algorithm. Proof. z can be expressed as z = xσ i for some x ∈ B + m and 1 ≤ i < m. Then,
Hereinafter, for a matrix M , let i M j , i M , and M j denote the (i, j)-th entry, the i-th row vector, and the j-th column vector of M , respectively. And, let Hdeg(M ) denote the highest degree of entries in M . Let c k and d k denote Hdeg(ρ m (z) k ) and Hdeg(ρ m (x) k ), respectively. Then
Let c(x) = j. We remark that since wlen(x) = l and l ≥ 2, there exists w ∈ B + m \{e m } such that x = wσ j . Case 1. |i − j| > 1 or i = j
In this case, z = wσ j σ i = wσ i σ j . So it suffices to show that c(z) = i or j. Here, we consider only the case of i < j − 1 (For the cases of i > j + 1 and i = j, the same results are obtained in a similar and easier way.).
Since c(x) = j and i Since σ i is clearly the last generator of z, it suffices to show that if c(z) = j, then σ j is another last generator of z. We do this in two steps. First, we prove that c(z) = j implies c(w) = j + 1. Then we prove that if c(w) = j + 1, σ j is the last generator of z.
Proof of the first step: Since z = wσ j σ j+1 ,
With this, c(z) = j implies the followings.
From these inequalities, we get c(w) = j + 1.
Proof of the second step: Since wlen(w) < l, there exists w ∈ B + m such that w = w σ j+1 . Since z = wσ j σ i = w σ j+1 σ j σ j+1 = w σ j σ j+1 σ j , c(z) turns out to indicate the last generator of z.
In this case, c q < d i+1 for all q < i, and c q ≤ d i+1 for all q > i + 1. Therefore, we check c i and c i+1 comparing with d i+1 .
Since c(x) = i + 1, we get (2), and hence c i+1 < c i from Eq.(3). Thus, we get the desired c(z) = i. Now we consider the other case,
However, it is easy to check that each of them is less than
let α k and β k be the coefficients of the highest degree entry in deg( k ρ m (x) i ) and deg( k ρ m (x) i+1 ), respectively. In this case,
So we can see that if
Otherwise, there are two cases:
The last case, (ii), points out the unique case when c(z) may fail to indicate the last generator of z. So the probability that this case happens is much lower than 1 m−1 .
Improved algorithms Theorem 1 shows that c(xσ i ) always succeeds in indicating the last generator of xσ i except in the case that c(x) = i+1, d i +1 = d i+1 , S i = S i+1 , and α k = β k for all k ∈ S i . So the failure probability appears very low under the condition stated in Theorem 1. Its loose upper bound is Combining the results of Theorem 1 with Hughes algorithm, this section proposes two algorithms recovering x from ρ m (x). The first algorithm arises from the basic property of braids we are dealing with. Being compared to Hughes algorithm, it is faster and its success probability is almost the same. The second algorithm comes from Theorem 1. Its success probability is higher and it is slower than Hughes'. The objective of these algorithms is to seek an unknown sequence (A[1] 
, where wlen(x) was already obtained in the process of computing ρ m (x) as mentioned in section 4.1. We describe more about these algorithms in Algorithms 1 and 2, and give experimental results in Table 1 and 2. Our experiment was performed on a computer with a Pentium IV 1.7 GHz processor using Maple 7. On input (m, l), our program chooses at random 500 x's from B + m with wlen(x) = l, computes ρ m (x) from x, computes z from ρ m (x) by each algorithm, and then determines whether or not z is equal to x by comparing their left-canonical forms. Compute jc = c (x).
3:
if there does not exist such jc then 4: break 5: else 6:
Although Algorithm 1 has an additional task to Hughes algorithm like checking whether or not k ρ m (x) j+1 ∈ tZ[t] for all k = 1, . . . , m at Step 2, it is eventually more efficient than his as in Table 1 . In our experiment, due to this task, Algorithm 1 stops on the way to building z usually much before wlen(z) = l if z = x. Namely, i >> 0 at Step 9. Whereas, Hughes algorithm goes on until wlen(z) = l even if z = x. So the time gap between these two algorithms grows as wlen(x) increases. Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 is gained from comparing the experiments of Algorithm 1 and Hughes algorithm, and from Theorem 1. The motivation is as follows. Given a positive braid x, let x 1 = σ c (x) , x 2 = σ c (xx
for k < wlen(x), and let x = xx Table 2 shows, the success probability of Algorithm 2 is higher than Algorithm 1. However, it is slower due to this self-correction process.
Algorithm 2 Finding x from ρ m (x) with self-correction
and
if there exists such jc and jc = ja then 5:
if i = l then 8: break 9:
end if 10:
if there is k(> i) such that jc = ja > 1 for M [k] and every entry of 
Attack on the BPKE
Using the methods in section 4.1 and 4.2, this section attempts to attack the BPKE for several parameters suggested by the inventors as in Table 3 , where a and x are assumed to be of inf(a) = inf(x) = 0. Since any attack on the revised BPKE is effective in the original scheme, and not vice versa, we consider the revised one here. Each wlen(x) in the last row of Table 3 is the average length of ten random x's given a braid index and a canonical-length. We recall that for a braid index n, a ∈ B n , m = n 2 , x 1 , x 2 ∈ B m . Computing ρ m (x 1 ) or ρ m (x 2 ) from (a, x 1 ax 2 ) From Figure 1 , we know that the probability of computing ρ m (x 1 ) or ρ m (x 2 ) from (a, x 1 ax 2 ) becomes high as len(a) increases for any n. In numerous experiments, these probabilities for the smallest len(a) (i.e., n = 50, 70, 90 and len(a) = 5) are 90% or so. And its running time is O(m 2 wlen(x i ) 2 ) as mentioned in section 4.1. Therefore, for all the parameters in Table 3 , either ρ m (x 1 ) or ρ m (x 2 ) is computed from (a, x 1 ax 2 ) with very high probability.
Recovering x from ρ m (x) Here, x = x 1 or x 2 in the above paragraph. In attacking the BPKE in practice, Algorithm 2 will have much higher success probability than Algorithm 1 as in Table 2 , however, it took too long time to be used on PC for large parameters. So, we used only Algorithm 1 due to its efficiency. Table 4 shows that for the first seven parameters in Table 3 10) ), x is recovered from ρ m (x) with significant probability within dozens of minutes.
For the last two parameters, we could not recover any x from ρ 35 (x) (resp. ρ 45 (x)) for 500 x's in B 35 (resp. B 45 ) with len(x) = 10. Compare the two cases: (n, len(x)) = (70, 5) and (50, 10). They have similar word-lengths, see Table 3 . The probability of recovering is 12% for the former and 0.2% for the latter, see Table 4 . With this observation, Theorem 1 implies that our attack gives an interesting condition contrary to brute force attack for the BPKE to be secure. When the word-length of private-key is fixed, the braid index should be large so that the BPKE is secure against brute force attack. However, it should be small against our attack.
Remark. Consider the so called generalized conjugacy problem (GCP) [11] : given (a, x −1 ax), find x, where a ∈ B n , x ∈ LB n . This is one of the problems on which our attack can be mounted by restating the equations e1, e2, e3 in section 4.1 as e1 : XB 1 = A 1 X, e2 : XB 2 = A 2 , e3 : B 3 = A 3 X, where X = ρ m (x). Clearly, all procedures are the same as those described in section 4.1 and 4.2. Hofheinz and Steinwandt [8] proposed an algorithm which solves the GCP more successfully and efficiently than ours. Thus, it can be used to solve the DH problem in B n , and hence to break the original BPKE. However, since their algorithm strongly depends on the conjugacy relation between public braids, it cannot be applied to the revised BPKE.
Conclusions
The security of the revised BPKE as well as the original one is based on the following computational problem: given (a, x 1 ax 2 ), find (z 1 , z 2 ) such that z 1 az 2 = x 1 ax 2 , where a ∈ B + n , x 1 , x 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ LB + n . Using the Burau representation, this paper proposes a new method of solving this problem. For seven out of the nine parameters suggested at [11] , we demonstrated the effectiveness of this method by recovering the private-key from the public-key with significant probability in a reasonable time (dozens of minutes plus low degree polynomial time).
On the other hand, we give a new requirement for secure parameters against our attack, which more or less conflicts with that against brute force attack. When we select private-key given word-length, its braid index should be large to defeat brute force attack. However, it should be small against our attack.
Hofheinz and Steinwandt's algorithms seem to be very efficient for large parameters, whereas they cannot be applied to the revised scheme at all. Our algorithms are effective in the revised scheme as well as the original scheme, whereas they are inefficient for very large parameters like those at [3] . Therefore, the revised BPKE with sufficiently large parameters appears to be secure at the current state of knowledge.
